Strong crypto settings: phase 3, final stage
Summary
TL;DR: Cryptographic policies will be tightened in Fedora 38-39, SHA-1 signatures will no longer be trusted by default. Test your setup with FUTURE today and file bugs so you won't get bit by F38-39.
As the next installment of our periodic tightening of cryptographic defaults, we're intending to bringing several changes to Fedora 39. The impact of them, notably distrusting SHA-1 signatures, might be so profound we're smoothing the rollout in time to give developers and maintainers ample time to react:
Fedora 36 StrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning1:
- SHA-1 signatures are distrusted in FUTURE policy (opt-in)
- TEST-FEDORA39 policy is provided
Fedora 37 StrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning2:
- creating and verifying SHA-1 signatures can logged to ease reporting bugs
Fedora 38 StrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning3:
- polices are updated, most notably
- SHA-1 signatures are distrusted in DEFAULT policy
- changes are reverted in branched f38 in time for Beta and do not reach users
Fedora 39 StrongCryptoSettings3:
- changes reach users
The plan is subject to change if it goes sideways somewhere along the way.
Owner
- Name: Alexander Sosedkin
- Email: asosedki@redhat.com
Current status
- Targeted release: Fedora Linux 39
- Last updated: 2022-04-27
- FESCo issue: <will be assigned by the Wrangler>
- Tracker bug: <will be assigned by the Wrangler>
- Release notes tracker: <will be assigned by the Wrangler>
Detailed Description
Secure defaults are an evermoving target. Fedora 28 had StrongCryptoSettings. Fedora 33 had StrongCryptoSettings2. Fedora 39 should have StrongCryptoSettings3.
By Fedora 39, the policies will be, in TLS perspective:
LEGACY MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-1 hash or better (no DSA) Ciphers: all available > 112-bit key, >= 128-bit block (no RC4 or 3DES) Key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE (no DHE-DSS) DH params size: >=2048 RSA params size: >=2048 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
DEFAULT MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: with SHA-224 hash or better (no DSA) Ciphers: >= 128-bit key, >= 128-bit block (AES, ChaCha20, including AES-CBC) Key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE (no DHE-DSS) DH params size: >= 2048 RSA params size: >= 2048 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
FUTURE MACs: All HMAC with SHA256 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-256 hash or better (no DSA) Ciphers: >= 256-bit key, >= 128-bit block, only Authenticated Encryption (AE) ciphers Key exchange: ECDHE, DHE DH params size: >= 3072 RSA params size: >= 3072 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
The flagship change this time will be distrusting SHA-1 signatures on the cryptographic library level, affecting more than just TLS.
OpenSSL will start blocking signature creation and verification by default, with the fallout anticipated to be wide enough for us to roll out the change across multiple cycles with multiple forewarnings. In Fedora 36, 37 and 38 released distrusting SHA-1 signatures will be opt-in. In Fedora 38 rawhide and Fedora 39 distrusting SHA-1 signatures will happen by default.
Feedback
A discussion has been raised on fedora-devel, a summary is available on LWN.
A change has the potential to prove disruptive and controversial, with much effort being focused on stretching it out in time.
There seems to be a consensus that the change has to be done eventually, but the ideal means of implementing it are in no way clear. The decision to discover code reliant on SHA-1 signatures by blocking creation/verification has not gathered many fans, but not many alternative proposals have been raised in return. A notable one, making the library somehow log the offending operations, has been incorporated in the proposal, though the effectiveness of it is yet to be seen in practice. Another notable takeaway point is the need to call for testing, which would be done in form of writing four Fedora Changes and testing SHA-1 signature distrusting during Fedora 37 & 38 Test Days. The change owner doesn't see the plan as an ideal one and continues to be open for feedback.
Benefit to Fedora
Fedora 39 will ship with more secure defaults to better match the everchanging landscape of cryptographic practices. TLS 1.0 / 1.1 protocol version will be disabled as they're deprecated, minimum key sizes will be raised to keep up with the computational advances etc.
Distrusting SHA-1 signatures specifically is expected to trigger a topical distribution-wide crackdown on weak cryptography, raising the security of the distribution moving forward.
Scope
- Proposal owners: implement changes described in Summary and Dependencies sections
- Other developers:
Test your applications with FUTURE policy. Move away from trusting SHA-1 signatures; ideally in time for F38 branch-off, for F39 release at the latest.
Follow SHA1SignaturesGuidance: 1. move away from trusting SHA-1 signatures entirely, or 2. distrust them by default and require explicit user opt-in to use a workaround
- Release engineering: #Releng issue number
Mass rebuild will not be needed, as change will be introduced in Fedora 38 rawhide (and reverted in Fedora 38 release, but not Fedora 39 release, so it'll be present in 39 from the start).
- Policies and guidelines: update needed
CryptoPolicies section of the packaging guidelines will have to be updated to reflect that SHA-1 signatures must not be trusted by default and provide guidance for openssl and gnutls. Components using workaround APIs must not use them without explicit user opt-in and must be added to a list of applications using a workaround API.
- Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)
- Alignment with Objectives: not with F36-era ones
Upgrade/compatibility impact
See "User experience".
Upgrade-time issues aren't specifically anticipated; if any were to arise, testing should find them in F38-times, to be fixed by F39 release at the latest.
Administrators willing to sacrifice security can apply LEGACY or FEDORA38 policies.
How To Test
Proceed to use the system as usual,
identify the workflows which are broken by blocking SHA-1 signature creation/verification,
ideally also verify that update-crypto-policies --set FEDORA38 fixes them,
file bug reports against the affected components if not filed already.
Please start your ticket title with StrongCryptoSettings3: ,
mention this change page, the version of crypto-policies package
and the policies under which your workflow does and does not work.
User Experience
Things will break. All kinds of things depending on SHA-1 signatures, openly and secretly.
- On Fedora 36 they'll break opt-in.
- On Fedora 37 they'll break opt-in, but it'll be possible to log them instead.
- On Fedora 38 rawhide they'll break by default.
- On Fedora 38 released they'll behave like in Fedora 37.
- On Fedora 39 they'll break by default again, including the released version.
Dependencies
A small coordinated change with openssl is required. In Fedora 38, openssl should start distrusting SHA-1 signatures when used with no configuration file. This does not affect the majority of scenarios, only applications that do not follow system-wide cryptographic policies.
All dependencies of core cryptographic libraries are affected, especially openssl ones relying on SHA-1 signatures.
Contingency Plan
- Contingency mechanism: Change owner can decide to defer the change reaching users from Fedora 39 released to a later release
- Contingency deadline: Fedora 39 Beta Freeze
- Blocks release? Yes
Documentation
Workaround API should be added to SHA1SignaturesGuidance. Packaging guidelines should be modified accordingly.
Release Notes
Fedora 36-38: trusting SHA-1 signatures is deprecated, users are encouraged to test with restrictive policies and file bugs.
Fedora 39: SHA-1 signatures are no longer trusted by default.