Strong crypto settings: phase 3, forewarning 1/2
Summary
Cryptographic policies will be tightened in Fedora 38-39, SHA-1 signatures will no longer be trusted by default. Fedora 37 specifically doesn't come with any change of defaults, and this Fedora Change is an advance warning filed for extra visibility. Test your setup with FUTURE today and file bugs so you won't get bit by Fedora 38-39.
Owner
- Name: Alexander Sosedkin
- Email: asosedki@redhat.com
Current status
- Targeted release: Fedora Linux 37
- Last updated: 2022-05-31
- devel thread
- FESCo issue: #2788
- Tracker bug: #2089811
- Release notes tracker: #841
Detailed Description
Secure defaults are an evermoving target. Fedora 28 had StrongCryptoSettings. Fedora 33 had StrongCryptoSettings2. Fedora 39 should have StrongCryptoSettings3.
The impact of one upcoming change, notably distrusting SHA-1 signatures, might be so profound we're smoothing the rollout in time to give developers and maintainers ample time to react:
Fedora 36:
- SHA-1 signatures are distrusted in FUTURE policy (opt-in)
- TEST-FEDORA39 policy is provided
- creating and verifying SHA-1 signatures is logged to ease reporting bugs
Fedora 37 StrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning1:
- (was initially reserved to implement logging of SHA-1 signature operations)
Fedora 38 StrongCryptoSettings3Forewarning2:
- policies are updated, most notably
- SHA-1 signatures are distrusted in DEFAULT policy
- changes are reverted in branched f38 in time for Beta and do not reach users
Fedora 39 StrongCryptoSettings3:
- changes reach users
The plan is subject to change if it goes sideways somewhere along the way.
By Fedora 39, the policies will be, in TLS perspective:
LEGACY MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-1 hash or better (no DSA) Ciphers: all available > 112-bit key, >= 128-bit block (no RC4 or 3DES) Key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE (no DHE-DSS) DH params size: >=2048 RSA params size: >=2048 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
DEFAULT MACs: All HMAC with SHA1 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: with SHA-224 hash or better (not DSA) Ciphers: >= 128-bit key, >= 128-bit block (AES, ChaCha20, including AES-CBC) Key exchange: ECDHE, RSA, DHE (no DHE-DSS) DH params size: >= 2048 RSA params size: >= 2048 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
FUTURE MACs: All HMAC with SHA256 or better + all modern MACs (Poly1305 etc.) Curves: all prime >= 255 bits (including Bernstein curves) Signature algorithms: SHA-256 hash or better (not DSA) Ciphers: >= 256-bit key, >= 128-bit block, only Authenticated Encryption (AE) ciphers Key exchange: ECDHE, DHE DH params size: >= 3072 RSA params size: >= 3072 TLS protocols: TLS >= 1.2
The flagship change this time will be distrusting SHA-1 signatures on the cryptographic library level, affecting more than just TLS.
OpenSSL will start blocking signature creation and verification by default, with the fallout anticipated to be wide enough for us to roll out the change across multiple cycles with multiple forewarnings. In Fedora 36, 37 and 38 released distrusting SHA-1 signatures will be opt-in. In Fedora 38 rawhide and Fedora 39 distrusting SHA-1 signatures will happen by default.
Feedback
A discussion has been raised on fedora-devel, a summary is available on LWN.
A change has the potential to prove disruptive and controversial, with much effort being focused on stretching it out in time.
There seems to be a consensus that the change has to be done eventually, but the ideal means of implementing it are in no way clear. The decision to discover code reliant on SHA-1 signatures by blocking creation/verification has not gathered many fans, but not many alternative proposals have been raised in return. A notable one, making the library somehow log the offending operations, has been incorporated in the proposal, though the effectiveness of it is yet to be seen in practice. Another notable takeaway point is the need to call for testing, which would be done in form of writing four Fedora Changes and testing SHA-1 signature distrusting during Fedora 37 & 38 Test Days. The change owner doesn't see the plan as an ideal one and continues to be open for feedback.
Benefit to Fedora
Fedora 39 will ship with more secure defaults to better match the everchanging landscape of cryptographic practices. TLS 1.0 / 1.1 protocol version will be disabled as they're [deprecated https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/rfc8996], minimum key sizes will be raised to keep up with the computational advances etc.
Distrusting SHA-1 signatures specifically is expected to trigger a topical distribution-wide crackdown on weak cryptography, raising the security of the distribution moving forward.
Scope
- Proposal owners: implement changes described in Summary and Dependencies sections
- Other developers:
Test your applications with FUTURE policy. Move away from trusting SHA-1 signatures; ideally in time for F38 branch-off, for F39 release at the latest.
Follow SHA1SignaturesGuidance: 1. move away from trusting SHA-1 signatures entirely, or 2. distrust them by default and require explicit user opt-in to use a workaround
- Release engineering: https://pagure.io/releng/issue/10770
Not sure if mass-rebuild is required if we land the change right after f38 branch-off. Maybe a "preview" mass-rebuild can be done with a special build in the Fedora 37 timeframe to cut down on Fedora 38 FTBFS.
- Policies and guidelines: update needed in time for Fedora 38
CryptoPolicies section of the packaging guidelines will have to be updated to reflect that SHA-1 signatures must not be trusted by default and provide guidance for openssl and gnutls. Components using workaround APIs must not use them without explicit user opt-in and must be added to a list of applications using a workaround API.
- Trademark approval: N/A (not needed for this Change)
- Alignment with Objectives: not with Fedora 37-era ones
Upgrade/compatibility impact
Nothing will change for Fedora 37 by default, the change is opt-in for now.
How To Test
Testing actively
Install crypto-policies-scripts package and switch to a more restrictive policy
with either update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE
or update-crypto-policies --set TEST-FEDORA39.
Proceed to use the system as usual, identify the workflows which are broken by this change.
Verify that the broken functionality works again
if you the policy is relaxed back
with, e.g., update-crypto-policies --set FUTURE:SHA1,
file bug reports against the affected components if not filed already.
Please start your ticket title with StrongCryptoSettings3: ,
mention this change page, the version of crypto-policies package
and the policies under which your workflow does and does not work.
Testing passively
Install a special logging tool from
https://copr.fedorainfracloud.org/coprs/asosedkin/sha1sig-tracer
Run it and proceed to use your system.
Once the tool notifies you about
about soon-to-be-blocked SHA-1 signature operations,
identify the component and actions leading to these operations,
verify that repeating them leads to logging more entries.
Ideally also verify that switching to a stricter policy breaks the workflow.
File bug reports against the affected components if not filed already.
Please start your ticket title with StrongCryptoSettings3:
and link to this change page.
User Experience
Things will break. All kinds of things depending on SHA-1 signatures, openly and secretly.
- On Fedora 37 they'll break opt-in.
- On Fedora 38 rawhide they'll break by default.
- On Fedora 38 released they'll behave like in Fedora 37.
- On Fedora 39 they'll break by default again, including the released version.
Dependencies
While it would be welcome, no reverse dependencies of openssl have to react in time for Fedora 37, where the change is opt-in preview only. For now, test, file bugs and spark discussions. A small coordinated change with openssl is required.
Contingency Plan
- Contingency mechanism: not needed for F37
- Contingency deadline: not needed for F37
- Blocks release? no
Documentation
Workaround API should be added to SHA1SignaturesGuidance. Packaging guidelines should be modified accordingly.