From Fedora Project Wiki
Time: 1400 UTC
Location: Freenode IRC #fedora-security
Agenda
- State of the SIG
- SIG page at https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SIGs/Red_Team
- GitHub project at https://github.com/fedoraredteam
- Currently using #fedora-security and security@lists.fedoraproject.org for comms
- Blog posts being reblogged by Planet Fedora security Subplanet
- Two projects active, others on the roadmap
- Active projects
- ELEM
- Enterprise Linux Exploit Mapper
- Ken Evensen lead developer
- Quick description and update
- Exploit curation crowdsourcing (Trello board)
- FCTL
- Replication of Cyber-ITL methodology and results in an open source and repeatable way
- Using a handful of open source tools to analyze binaries
- Radare2
- Capstone Engine
- hardening-check
- Results currently go into Mongo
- Looking to transition to ELK for better vis layer
- Plan to analyze RHEL, CentOS, and Fedora
- Would love community contributions for other OSes
- ELEM
- Roadmap projects
- Fedora Security Data API
- Red Container
- Kali is great, the world doesn’t need another security distro
- OCI makes packaging efforts obsolete
- PTES
- Spoke with David Kennedy (cofounder), who keynoted our Defense in Depth event this week
- We’re going to work with the project, no need to fork
- Plan to migrate to GitHub / RTD interface
- Next touchpoint is late October, should have an update by next SIG meeting
- Reference Architectures
- Two planned
- Using GitHub / RTD for this as well to support collaboration
- Definition of Cyber Range
- About 50% complete
- Much of the diagrams and copy can be taken from proposals we’ve written
- Next-Generation Malware Analysis
- Also about 50% complete
- Can re-use proposal work
- For each, targeting similar structure to NIST SP800-145
- Essential characteristics
- Deployment models
- Service models
- Should be active by next SIG meeting
- Pen tests
- Eclipse Foundation
- Partner closely with them on other topics, JEE, Geospatial
- Started coordination with Eclipse for a pro bono pen test
- Need to pick this back up
- Plan to use this to flesh out PTES needed updates
- Will open source pen test report after findings are remediated
- Looking for other clients who would like a pen test so we can better update PTES
- Eclipse Foundation
- Team to-do
- Order swag, looking for recommendations, probably hats
- Need to get team calendar set up
- Better document ELEM
- Add more instructions to Trello for curation crowdsourcing
Minutes
08:44 -!- Topic set by Sparks [~Sparks@redhat/sparks] [Mon Nov 9 13:50:48 2015] 08:44 [Users #fedora-security] 08:44 [ _0x5eb_ ] [ Caterpillar ] [ hkario ] [ mhayden ] [ patricku ] [ tyll_ ] 08:44 [ anthraxx ] [ charcol ] [ ingvarha ] [ mmercer_ ] [ pbrobinson ] [ warren ] 08:44 [ Astranox ] [ cliff-hm ] [ jasoncallaway] [ muep ] [ pjp ] [ zodbot ] 08:44 [ athmane ] [ danofsatx ] [ Jesin ] [ N3LRX ] [ puiterwijk ] [ zoglesby] 08:44 [ awestin1 ] [ davidstrauss] [ jonatoni ] [ nb ] [ relrod ] 08:44 [ bowlofeggs] [ dazo ] [ jtaylor90 ] [ nirik ] [ Shad0w_Crux] 08:44 [ bress ] [ dgilmore ] [ kushal ] [ noctavian] [ simo ] 08:44 [ c0mrad3_ ] [ dmalcolm ] [ linuxmodder ] [ OsakaFoo ] [ skamath ] 08:44 [ Casper_v2 ] [ FranciscoD ] [ mbag ] [ oszi ] [ Sparks ] 08:44 -!- Irssi: #fedora-security: Total of 49 nicks [0 ops, 0 halfops, 0 voices, 49 normal] 08:44 -!- Channel #fedora-security created Sun Nov 26 01:43:28 2006 08:44 -!- Irssi: Join to #fedora-security was synced in 16 secs 08:57 -!- Jesin [~Jesin@pool-72-83-138-15.washdc.fios.verizon.net] has quit [Quit: Leaving] 09:09 < linuxmodder> I'll be traveling damn near till start time but be there in spirit if nothing else and catch up at bsidesdc 09:26 < jasoncallaway> linuxmodder: no worries, see you tomorrow 09:27 < linuxmodder> not coming today for day 1 jasoncallaway 09:31 -!- nirik [~nirik-fre@96.71.165.137] has quit [Ping timeout: 246 seconds] 09:39 -!- nirik [~nirik-fre@96.71.165.137] has joined #fedora-security 09:46 -!- mode/#fedora-security [+o jasoncallaway] by ChanServ 09:47 -!- jasoncallaway changed the topic of #fedora-security to: Fedora Red Team meeting 1400-1500 UTC 09:47 -!- mode/#fedora-security [-o jasoncallaway] by ChanServ 09:55 -!- k6n [~k6n@pool-100-15-218-58.washdc.fios.verizon.net] has joined #fedora-security 09:58 -!- nsabine [~nsabine@pool-173-66-170-163.washdc.fios.verizon.net] has joined #fedora-security 09:58 < jasoncallaway> Ok, everybody, we're going to get started in a few minutes 09:58 < jasoncallaway> The agenda for today is at https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/FRT_meeting_20171006 09:59 < jasoncallaway> We'll also capture and post a log of this meeting for folks who might miss it 10:00 < jasoncallaway> First, a quick review 10:00 < jasoncallaway> The Fedora Red Team is a Fedora Project Special Interest Group (SIG) 10:01 < jasoncallaway> Our SIG page is at https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/SIGs/Red_Team 10:01 < jasoncallaway> We're doing our source control at https://github.com/fedoraredteam 10:01 < jasoncallaway> Our goal is to be Red Hat's cybersecurity upstream community 10:01 < jasoncallaway> We get a lot of questions about what that actually means 10:02 < jasoncallaway> On the SIG page we talk a bit about the etymology of the term 10:02 < jasoncallaway> But these days, "cyber" could be described as Computer Network Operations (CNO) 10:02 -!- MikeCamel [~mbursell@81.141.162.32] has joined #fedora-security 10:02 < jasoncallaway> That's broken down into Computer Network Defense (CND) 10:02 < jasoncallaway> Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 10:02 < jasoncallaway> And Computer Network 10:02 < jasoncallaway> Comput Network Attack (CNA) 10:03 < jasoncallaway> So the name "Fedora Red Team" is a bit of an intentional misnomer 10:03 < jasoncallaway> But in a way, offensive R&D is a superset of defensive 10:04 < jasoncallaway> You can't do the former without also understanding (and developing) the latter 10:04 < jasoncallaway> For anybody reading the log of this, we're on Freenode IRC #fedora-security 10:04 < jasoncallaway> And you can subscribe to the Fedora Security list at security@lists.fedoraproject.org 10:05 < jasoncallaway> If you'd like to blog about Fedora Red Team, we'd encourage you to add your blog's category to Planet Fedora 10:06 < jasoncallaway> You can find instructions on how to do so here https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Planet?rd=Planet_HowTo 10:06 < jasoncallaway> We're on the Security subplanet here http://fedoraplanet.org/security/ 10:06 < jasoncallaway> Ok, let's talk about our projects 10:06 < jasoncallaway> We have two that are actively going at the moment 10:07 < jasoncallaway> The Enterprise Linux Exploit Mapper (ELEM) is coming along nicely 10:07 < jasoncallaway> k6n: you're the lead developer for ELEM, could you describe it a bit? 10:07 < k6n> certainly 10:07 -!- lkerner [~lkerner@ip72-196-202-69.dc.dc.cox.net] has joined #fedora-security 10:08 < k6n> There are a number of sources of information for vulnerabilities as well as exploits. 10:08 < k6n> When a vulnerability is scored, often with CVSS, it is against theoretical exploits. 10:09 < k6n> And with the vulnerability is scored by the US NIST, it is scored only once and never updated. 10:10 < k6n> Some vulnerabilities are relevant to enterprise Linux, many aren't. 10:10 < k6n> So the point of ELEM is to help correlate, test and score exploits on enterprise Linux systems. 10:11 < k6n> The objective is to build a library of curated exploits that have each been tested on different enterprise Linux platforms. 10:11 < k6n> The ELEM tool is at https://github.com/fedoraredteam/elem.git 10:11 < k6n> The curation information is at https://github.com/fedoraredteam/elem-curation 10:12 < jasoncallaway> k6n: maybe we should describe the curation process 10:12 < k6n> The tool is beta at the moment. 10:12 < k6n> Yup. 10:12 < k6n> When we score the exploit, we are interested in a couple of things. 10:12 < k6n> What does the exploit do? 10:13 < k6n> How well does the exploit do it? 10:13 < jasoncallaway> If it works at all... 10:13 < k6n> We have to use an ontology that is comprehensive and comprehensible. 10:14 < k6n> We've chosen the STRIDE scheme. 10:14 < k6n> spoof, tamper, repudiate, information disclosure, denial of service, elevation of privilege 10:14 < jasoncallaway> Here's the link from Microsoft https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee823878(v=cs.20).aspx 10:15 < k6n> The approach right now is to assign a number 0-9 to each of the letters. 10:15 < k6n> For example, a shellshock exploit is an example of tampering. 10:15 < jasoncallaway> FWIW, we think we're ok using STRIDE. It's still unclear if it's license-encumbered in any way. We're researching. 10:15 < k6n> if an exploit works on a host, we would score it 090000 10:16 < k6n> Likely it would only do tampering very well, but not any of the others. However, the scoring schema allows for that possibility. 10:17 < jasoncallaway> k6n: could an exploit ever have values in multiple columns? For example, what if the reverse shell works sometimes but most times it crashes the process? Would that have a value in D? 10:17 < k6n> If that was the intent of the exploit, yes. 10:17 < jasoncallaway> (Obligitory "it's over 9000!" comment) 10:18 < k6n> But if it is an accidental side-effect of a tamper, then no 10:18 -!- MikeCamel [~mbursell@81.141.162.32] has left #fedora-security ["Leaving"] 10:19 < k6n> I'll pivot to the curation 10:19 < k6n> Our intent is to assess exploits mapped to CVE's on each of the enterprise Linux platforms (RHEL, Fedora, CentOS) 10:19 < k6n> We are starting with RHEL. 10:20 < k6n> Furthermore, we want to look at both RHEL 6 and 7. 10:20 < k6n> And desktop, workstation and server. 10:20 < k6n> This is no small undertaking. 10:20 < jasoncallaway> So I ran anelem refresh
andelem assess
on a RHEL 7.0 system 10:20 < jasoncallaway> It mapped 138 CVEs to known exploits 10:21 < jasoncallaway> I think we've curated 12 of those 10:21 < k6n> It takes some time. 10:21 < jasoncallaway> So there's a lot of work to do with testing these 10:22 < jasoncallaway> We need to crowdsource that 10:22 < k6n> As I mentioned earlier, we've separated the tool from the data 10:22 < k6n> Initially it was all in one repo, but that didn't work for long. 10:22 < k6n> The curation information will remain under version control. 10:22 < k6n> We welcome pull requests. 10:23 < jasoncallaway> I've set up a public Trello board at https://trello.com/b/1fbRYkiQ/exploit-curation 10:23 < k6n> Please note that we will only accept pull requests with commits signed with a GPG key 10:23 < jasoncallaway> I'll be writing some Python to create all cards for mapped EDBID->CVE relationships 10:23 < k6n> cool 10:23 < jasoncallaway> Then it'd be great if folks could find an untested mapping and test it 10:24 < jasoncallaway> There's value in re-testing these, as well. It could be we'll score something with a 4, as in, it's hard to get to work reliably, but maybe we did something wrongly and somebody else was able to get the exploit to work nicely 10:25 < jasoncallaway> There's also some challenge in setting up the test harness 10:25 < k6n> That's right 10:25 < k6n> In order to expedite testing, we've created an Ansible role to help 10:25 -!- Jesin [~Jesin@wsip-72-194-198-163.dc.dc.cox.net] has joined #fedora-security 10:25 < k6n> https://github.com/fedoraredteam/cyber-test-range-target 10:26 < k6n> By specifying a list of CVE's, the role will ensure the target host is vulnerable by downgrading packages if necessary. 10:26 < jasoncallaway> Oh, cool 10:26 < jasoncallaway> So it'll downgrade a fully patched system? 10:27 < k6n> Potentially, yes. 10:27 < k6n> So in the Red Hat Security API, the "fixed" package is listed for a CVE 10:27 < k6n> Using Yum and Ansible, we can determine which package is one step down from that version 10:28 < k6n> If a host is already vulnerable to a CVE, the role happily ignores it. 10:28 < k6n> If not, it will yum downgrade that package. 10:28 < k6n> This done by a combination of custom facts as well as a custom lookup plugin 10:29 < jasoncallaway> Should we consider an enhancement PR to the yum Ansible module for package downgrade? 10:29 < k6n> So the Ansible role has a Red Hat Security API lookup plugin 10:29 < k6n> It already does that for us 10:29 < jasoncallaway> Oh, but we need the version number first? It would be nice if we could just do version-1 or something 10:29 < jasoncallaway> Or latest-1 I mean 10:30 < nsabine> You're assuming latest-1 is what you want 10:31 < nsabine> You might want a version from 6 months ago 10:31 < jasoncallaway> Ah, good point 10:31 < k6n> Indeed 10:31 < k6n> so the way it works at the moment is... 10:31 < k6n> First, Ansible runs the setup module and builds custom facts per the role 10:32 < k6n> The available_packages.fact results in a dictionary of all packages available 10:32 < k6n> including the "next" and "previous" version 10:32 < k6n> Kind of like a double linked list 10:32 < jasoncallaway> Ooooh, ok cool 10:33 < jasoncallaway> +1 for your Ansible kungfu, k6n 10:33 < k6n> When the lookup plugin grabs the package info from the api, we know what the dowgrade version is 10:33 < k6n> *downgrade 10:33 < k6n> The role uses the yum module to install that version 10:34 < k6n> As an aside, I hadn't put this on Ansible Galaxy yet. 10:34 < k6n> Should we? 10:34 < jasoncallaway> Totes mcgrotes 10:34 < jasoncallaway> Ok, so we're looking for community members to help out with curation crowdsourcing 10:35 < jasoncallaway> I think this is a good place to point people when they say, "cool, how can I help?" 10:35 < jasoncallaway> Also, it's a good introduction to cybersecurity for folks new to the field 10:35 < jasoncallaway> Anything else on ELEM, or should we move on? 10:36 < k6n> nope 10:36 < jasoncallaway> Ok 10:36 < k6n> let's move along 10:36 < jasoncallaway> FCTL 10:36 < jasoncallaway> Fedora Cyber Test Lab 10:37 < jasoncallaway> I really wanted this to be FTL, by the way, for "faster than light" 10:37 < jasoncallaway> But we're not testing all of Fedora, so it seemed wrong 10:37 < k6n> ^Can you approve my Git org request when you get a chance? 10:37 < jasoncallaway> yup 10:37 < jasoncallaway> So FCTL is our open source implementation of the Cyber-ITL approach to risk quantification 10:37 < k6n> Sorry, didn't mean to hijack your thought process 10:38 < jasoncallaway> np 10:38 < jasoncallaway> The git repo is here https://github.com/fedoraredteam/cyber-test-lab but it's empty 10:38 < jasoncallaway> I have a 0.1 ready to go but haven't pushed it yet 10:38 < jasoncallaway> Meant to do that last night but got busy with our FRT datasheet for BSidesDC tomorrow 10:39 < jasoncallaway> Which, for anybody who wants it, is here https://jasoncallaway.fedorapeople.org/frt_datasheet.pdf 10:40 < jasoncallaway> I need to double-check with the Fedora Design Team that we're good on logo usage. I reviewed their usage page, which is here https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Logo/UsageGuidelines, and I think we're good, but I'd like a confirmation 10:40 < jasoncallaway> I'll take that action for Tuesday (I'm on PTO on Monday since BSides is all weekend) 10:40 < jasoncallaway> Ok, back to FCTL 10:41 < jasoncallaway> The Cyber-ITL approach was described at Def Con 24 (https://youtu.be/GhO9vyW1f7w) 10:41 < jasoncallaway> They're trying to quantify the risk of using certain binaries via static and dynamic anlysis 10:41 < jasoncallaway> It looks awesome 10:42 < jasoncallaway> But I don't think they plan to open source their implementation 10:42 < jasoncallaway> And from a Fedora perspective, we might say, ok, how can we improve our score? But not have a way to easily check the result 10:42 < jasoncallaway> So as I said, I'll be pushing my attempt at recreating their methodology 10:42 < jasoncallaway> It's not exact, but I think I can get close 10:43 < jasoncallaway> The plan track many of the same things the CTIL is 10:43 < k6n> cool 10:43 < jasoncallaway> Cyclomatic complexity, branch frequency... 10:43 < jasoncallaway> Binary hardening features like use of ASLR, RELRO, immediate binding, etc. 10:43 < jasoncallaway> Also just function size is important 10:44 < jasoncallaway> We can do this with a number of FOSS tools 10:44 < jasoncallaway> Capstone Engine gives us a nice SDK for decompiling 10:44 < jasoncallaway> Radare2 takes things a little further and gives us an easy way to measure cyclomatic complexity since it can generate a function call graph 10:45 < jasoncallaway> An awesome engineer at Google named Kees Cook wrote a tool called hardening-check that looks for binary hardening 10:45 < jasoncallaway> Oh, function fortification and use of bad functions are another metric 10:45 < jasoncallaway> The latter is harder for us to score 10:46 < jasoncallaway> Because we have some idea of good and bad functions, but we don't really have a spectrum of bad function riskiness 10:46 < jasoncallaway> And that's just the static anlysis 10:46 < jasoncallaway> The next step is to assemble a score on a per-binary basis using those metrics 10:46 < jasoncallaway> And we need to dial in the weight of each 10:47 < jasoncallaway> Then we look at the low-hanging fruit 10:47 < jasoncallaway> And start fuzzing 10:47 < jasoncallaway> Which should turn up all sorts of interesting crashes 10:47 < jasoncallaway> At DC 25 this year, Sarah Zatko provided a CITL update 10:47 < jasoncallaway> I haven't been able to find a video of it 10:47 < jasoncallaway> If anybody has one, I'd love it 10:48 < jasoncallaway> She described the number of crashes they were able to generate 10:48 < jasoncallaway> I believe in the CITL blog they mentioned their fuzzing environment has about 100 cores 10:48 < jasoncallaway> Maybe 80, I can't remember 10:48 < jasoncallaway> I have about 50 at home in my lab here I can use 10:49 < jasoncallaway> Still, there's lots of work to do, and I'm sure I'm getting lots of stuff wrong 10:49 < jasoncallaway> But that's the point of doing it open source 10:49 < jasoncallaway> I'll also post the results to some static analysis runs for RHEL 7, CentOS 7, and Fedora 26 10:49 < jasoncallaway> Probably as JSON objects 10:49 < jasoncallaway> Right now I'm dumping stuff into Mongo 10:50 < jasoncallaway> But I think ELK will be a better choice with nicer vis options 10:50 < jasoncallaway> Any questions or comments on FCTL? 10:50 < jasoncallaway> We're running low on time so let's blast through the last parts 10:50 < jasoncallaway> Projects on the road map 10:51 < jasoncallaway> Fedora needs its own Security Data API, so we'll be working on that 10:51 < jasoncallaway> Folks ask me if we're making a Kali for Fedora, the answer is NO 10:51 < jasoncallaway> I don't see any value in that 10:51 < jasoncallaway> Kali is great, and there are already many other security distros 10:51 < jasoncallaway> Fedora Security Lab, too 10:52 < jasoncallaway> But I would like to see more granular container images for Kali tooling 10:52 < jasoncallaway> Right now the Kali docker image is like a full install 10:52 < jasoncallaway> What if I just wanted an individual tool like nmap? 10:52 < nsabine> jasoncallaway: You said you have 0.1 almost ready to push. When do you expect to push that? 10:52 < jasoncallaway> (Bad example, that's already packaged in rpm) 10:52 < nsabine> (on the FCTL) 10:52 < jasoncallaway> nsabine: good question. I hope to do that tonight, possibly this weekend while on booth duty at BSidesDC 10:53 < nsabine> ok, thanks 10:53 < jasoncallaway> So a containerization of infosec tools effort is what we meant by Red Container 10:53 < jasoncallaway> We're going to participate in the Pen Testing Execution Standard 10:53 < jasoncallaway> I got a chance to chat with Dave Kennedy of Binary Sec this week 10:54 < jasoncallaway> Hey keynoted our Defense in Depth conference 10:54 < jasoncallaway> And killed it, BTW 10:54 < jasoncallaway> He's a cofounder of PTES 10:54 < jasoncallaway> So we're looking forward to dusting that project off together 10:54 < jasoncallaway> We're going to work on reference architectures 10:55 < jasoncallaway> Two at first 10:55 < jasoncallaway> 1) A Definition of the Cyber Range, and 2) Next Generation Malware Analysis Cloud 10:55 < jasoncallaway> Both are about 50% done from proposal efforts 10:56 < jasoncallaway> We just need to clean up that content and make it ready for release 10:56 < jasoncallaway> Moving onto pen testing 10:56 < jasoncallaway> We're talking to the Eclipse Foundation about helping them out with a pen test of their infra 10:56 < jasoncallaway> In return, they might be able to help us with legal and IP stuff 10:56 < jasoncallaway> At which they kick ass 10:57 < jasoncallaway> Once we finish the pen test, and they get a chance to remediate, we'll open source the pen test report 10:57 < jasoncallaway> Everything will be tied back to PTES, and we'll use this as an oppotunity to update the latter 10:57 < jasoncallaway> So, our hour's almost up, and I want to be respectful of everybody's time 10:57 < jasoncallaway> Just actions now 10:57 < jasoncallaway> I need to get some swag ordered now that we have a team logo 10:58 < jasoncallaway> https://pagure.io/design/issue/546 10:58 < jasoncallaway> We also need a team calendar 10:58 < jasoncallaway> Yesterday we had a great call with charcol on documentation 10:58 < jasoncallaway> So we're hoping to make the ELEM docs better 10:59 < charcol> I'm hoping to work on them this week sometime 10:59 < jasoncallaway> Hey, charcol! 10:59 < jasoncallaway> Thanks! You're awesome! 10:59 < jasoncallaway> I've got that Trello board up for ELEM curation crowdsourcing 10:59 < jasoncallaway> But I need to populate the cards withelem assess
output 10:59 < jasoncallaway> And I think that's it 11:00 < jasoncallaway> Anybody else have anything to add? 11:00 < k6n> nope 11:01 < jasoncallaway> Oh, and I'll get with Fedora Design on the data sheet 11:01 < jasoncallaway> Ok, thanks very much, everybody 11:01 < jasoncallaway> Hope to see the local folks at BSidesDC this weekend 11:02 < k6n> cool cool 11:02 < nsabine> thanks jason! 11:02 -!- mode/#fedora-security [+o jasoncallaway] by ChanServ 11:02 -!- jasoncallaway changed the topic of #fedora-security to: Fedora Security help room | We try to answer security questions here. | DO NOT DISCUSS EMBARGOED INFORMATION HERE. | Additional information: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Category:Security 11:03 -!- mode/#fedora-security [-o jasoncallaway] by ChanServ